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ABSTRACT 
 
In response to the takeover of the American Embassy in Iran in 1979, President Jimmy Carter 
issued two executive orders freezing assets owned by the Iranian government and by Iranian 
citizens and held by U.S. financial institutions. The case examines an incident that arose following 
the implementation of these orders and examines (1) the use of global businesses as instruments of 
foreign policy; (2) issues of cross-cultural communication and trust; and (3) crisis management. 
The case may be useful for classes in international business, in negotiation, and in conflict 
resolution. 
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BACKGROUND 
 
he International Bank and Trust was founded in the 1800’s and was one of the first banks chartered 
in the United States to open overseas offices. The bank is headquartered in New York City and ranks 
among the world top 100 financial institutions in terms of asset size and profitability. While a 
majority of its stock is owned by US nationals, significant minority interests are held by British and Saudi investors. 
In the mid-1950’s, the International Bank and Trust opened a branch in Beirut, Lebanon. At the time of the events 
described below, approximately two thirds of the bank’s profits came from its international operations.  
 
THE BRANCH 
 
Based in New York, Ted Baker was promoted to the position of regional manager for the Mid-East after a 
successful two year term running the area office for Australia and New Zealand in 1970/71. His practice of hiring 
local managers to run the overseas branches was a novel managerial approach; past practice had been to hire local 
people for the staff positions, but to appoint an ex-pat in the managerial role. Ted’s approach had worked out very 
well. The new managers had used their understanding of the local practices and their relationships with businesses 
and investors to the bank’s advantage. 
 
 By the 1970’s, the Beirut branch had become a thriving office. Ted hired Rashid in 1973 to manage the 
Beirut office. Born in Lebanon and educated in Cairo, Rashid had spent his early career in financial services in 
several locations throughout the Mid-East, but this was his first experience working for a US-based company. Under 
Rashid’s guidance, the branch was able to build a sizable client base of wealthy investors from countries throughout 
the region – from Turkey to Pakistan. Private banking services were provided to wealthy individuals, including a full 
array of investment, currency translation and transfer services.  
 
By placing funds in a bank based in a country in which there is a possibility of political unrest or a hostile 
takeover, a depositor runs the risk that his or her funds may be confiscated by a new regime. The money center 
banks of London, Tokyo and New York were felt to be free of such risk and came to be known as “safe havens”.  
 
THE INCIDENT 
 
On November 4, 1979, a group of students led by Ebrahim Asgharzadeh overran the US Embassy in Iran, 
taking 53 American hostages. President Jimmy Carter attempted to negotiate with the government of Iran, but when 
initial efforts were unsuccessful, he decided to take action. Executive Order 12170 required American companies 
holding the assets of the Iranian government or its agencies to “freeze” those assets, that is, not to confiscate the 
funds but to deny the owners access to them. 
T 
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 This executive order, along with the other actions taken by the United States did not resolve the hostage 
situation. On April 7, 1980, the freeze on Iranian assets was expanded by Executive Order 12205 to include funds 
owned by people residing in Iran as well as those of any organization controlled by an Iranian citizen. 
 
 Rashid received his orders on the morning of April 8. He was to identify any assets held by Iranian 
nationals or Iranian owned businesses and to transmit the funds to New York for safe keeping. Rashid considered his 
position. The local sentiment favored the Iranians. His investors were wealthy and, very often, powerful. Rashid 
knew he had very little time to decide whether or not he would comply with the directions of his manager.  
 
 Rashid cabled Ted with the following: “Confiscating funds of Iranian nationals difficult to implement. 
Lebanese courts will not likely support order issued by US President. Defeats our position as a safe haven. 
Significant money involved so local staff at safety risk. Sorry, cannot comply. Please advise.” 
 
THE NEW YORK REACTION 
 
The cable had arrived at the bank’s head office at 9:00am New York time, meaning that it was 4:00pm in 
Beirut. The office would be closing in one hour; while it would be possible to contact Rashid at his home, if any had 
to be taken that would involve direct contact between Ted and the other employees of the branch, the only reliable 
communication would have to happen by placing a call to the branch while it was still open.  
 
The consequences of disobeying the executive order were not clearly laid out in the order itself, but Ted 
and his fellow managers knew that civil and or criminal penalties might apply. Moreover, there would be public 
scrutiny of the bank’s actions. Ted knew that he had to act quickly. 
 
ANALYSIS QUESTIONS 
 
 What responsibility does Ted have to the employees in the Beirut branch? What responsibility does Ted 
have to comply with Executive Order 12205? 
 What are Rashid’s responsibilities to his customers? To his employees? 
 Discuss the concept of an international company versus a US company with overseas offices. 
 Discuss the issues of the case in terms of trust and communication. How should Ted approach his 
negotiations with Rashid? 
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FOOTNOTES 
 
Executive Order 12170 – Issued 14-Nov-1979 
 
Pursuant to the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the United States including the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C.A. sec. 1701 et seq., the National Emergencies Act, 50 
U.S.C. sec. 1601 et seq., and 3 U.S.C. sec. 301. 
 
I, JIMMY CARTER, President of the United States, find that the situation in Iran constitutes an unusual and 
extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy and economy of the United States and hereby declare a 
national emergency to deal with that threat. 
 
I hereby order blocked all property and interests in property of the Government of Iran, its instrumentalities and 
controlled entities and the Central Bank of Iran which are or become subject to the jurisdiction of the United States 
or which are in or come within the possession or control of persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. 
 
The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to employ all powers granted to me by the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act to carry out the provisions of this order. 
 
This order is effective immediately and shall be transmitted to the Congress and published in the Federal Register. 
 
Executive Order 12205 – Issued 7-Apr-1980 
 
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, including Section 
203 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702), Section 301 of Title 3 of the United 
States Code, and Section 301 of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1631), in order to take steps additional to 
those set forth in Executive Order No. 12170 of November 14, 1979, to deal with the threat to the national security, 
foreign policy and economy of the United States referred to in that Order, and in furtherance of the objectives of 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 461 (1979) adopted on December 31, 1979, it is hereby ordered as 
follows: 
 
1-101. The following are prohibited effective immediately, notwithstanding any contracts entered into or licenses 
granted before the date of this Order:  
 
(a) The sale, supply or other transfer, by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, of any items, 
commodities or products, except food, medicine and supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, and donations 
of clothing intended to be used to relieve human suffering, from the United States, or from any foreign country, 
whether or not originating in the United States, either to or destined for Iran, an Iranian governmental entity in Iran, 
any other person or body in Iran or any other person or body for the purposes of any enterprise carried on in Iran.  
 
(b) The shipment by vessel, aircraft, railway or other land transport of United States registration or owned by or 
under charter to any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or the carriage (whether or not in bond) by 
land transport facilities across the United States of any of the items, commodities and products covered by paragraph 
(a) of this section which are consigned to or destined for Iran, an Iranian governmental entity or any person or body 
in Iran, or to any enterprise carried on in Iran.  
 
(c) The shipment from the United States of any of the items, products and commodities covered by paragraph (a) of 
this section on vessels or aircraft registered in Iran.  
 
(d) The following acts, when committed by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States in connection 
with any transaction involving Iran, an Iranian governmental entity, an enterprise controlled by Iran or an Iranian 
governmental entity, or any person in Iran:  
i. Making available any new credits or loans;  
ii. Making available any new deposit facilities or allowing substantial increases in non-dollar deposits 
which exist as of the date of this Order;  
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iii. Allowing more favorable terms of payment than are customarily used in international commercial 
transactions;  
iv. Failing to act in a businesslike manner in exercising any rights when payments due on existing credits 
or loans are not made in a timely manner; or  
v. Make any payment, transfer of credit, or other transfer of funds or other property or interests therein, 
except for purposes of family remittances.  
 
(e) The engaging by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States in any service contract in support of 
an industrial project in Iran, except any such contract entered into prior to the date of this Order or concerned with 
medical care.  
 
(f) The engaging by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States in any transaction which evades or 
avoids, or has the purpose or effect of evading or avoiding, any of the prohibitions set forth in this section.  
[Para. 1-101 amended by Executive Order 12211 of Apr. 17, 1980, 45 FR 26685, 3 CFR, 1980 Comp., p. 253] 
 
1-102. The prohibitions in section 1-101 above shall not apply to transactions by any person subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States which is a non-banking association, corporation, or other organization organized 
and doing business under the laws of any foreign country. 
 
1-103. The Secretary of the Treasury is delegated, and authorized to exercise, all functions vested in the President by 
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to carry out the purposes of this Order. 
The Secretary may redelegate any of these functions to other officers and agencies of the Federal government. 
 
1-104. The Secretary of the Treasury shall ensure that actions taken pursuant to this Order and Executive Order No. 
12170 are accounted for as required by Section 401 of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1641). 
 
1-105. This Order is effective immediately. In accord with Section 401 of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 
1641) and Section 204 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703), it shall be 
immediately transmitted to the Congress and published in the Federal Register. 
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CASE DISCUSSION 
 
In this case, extrinsic factors have created a tense situation within the Middle Eastern operations of the 
International Bank and Trust. President Jimmy Carter created a role for international companies that was beyond the 
scope of their original charters – to assist in the execution of foreign policy. A task of this nature might be adopted 
and accomplished more easily when the government provides its own safety and security functions, but here the 
mandate of the US government extended to foreign lands where neither of these protections was present. 
 
The Responsibilities of Ted and Rashid 
 
The case concerns how each level of management defined its priorities and, therefore, its negotiating 
position. Rashid is concerned about the welfare of the people within his employ, the local branch personnel who 
might be at risk if the assets of several of his wealthy and powerful clients are, in his words, “confiscated.” He is 
also concerned about his clients and the funds he has convinced them to deposit with the International Bank and 
Trust. Finally, he feels that the business model, that of providing banking services free of political influence, is 
being compromised. 
 
Ted, on the other hand, is being compelled to comply with an Executive Order – something which has the 
effect of law, and for which non-compliance could carry criminal penalties. Although distantly related to the case, 
Ted may also be concerned about the hostages in Iran, and want to participate in the solution proposed by President 
Carter in the hope that he may assist in resolving that crisis. 
 
The International Bank and Trust had been acting in the manner of an international organization. It had 
offered products and services which were of use to customers in the local market of the Mid-East, and had hired 
people from the area who understood and abided by local customs and practices in applying its products to the 
market. The local management shared a basic organizational goal of growing the business and was hired, in part, 
because of a willingness to use personal contacts to assist in accomplishing this. Regional management had 
conceived of this structure and was using it to the benefit of the organization. 
 
What then happens when an exogenous shock causes regional management to abandon the psychological 
contract it had created with local management? If trust had developed between Ted and Rashid, how deeply might 
this reversal threaten that relationship? The conflict between Ted and Rashid has been triggered by an upheaval of 
priorities on the part of management, and the very short time frame within which a solution must be found adds 
intensity to the situation.  
 
 Rashid, enmeshed in his own local branch business, involved with friends and business contacts whose 
trust he is being directed to violate and concerned for the safety of his staff, objected to the order. The answer he 
gave focused only on the world in which he lived; it is uncertain whether he assessed the international setting in 
which the whole organization exists or considered the set of options immediately available to Ted. Whether the 
immediate environment of his branch created bounds for his decision making or was merely his priority, the effect 
was the same.  
 
Instead of treating the situation as an arms-length problem to be solved, (see: Follett, 2005, p. 154) both the 
regional and local manager treated the situation as a question of loyalty, and their priorities caused them to take 
different positions.  
 
An International Organization 
 
Organizations that operate in the global environment are subject to political risk. In this instance, the 
United States sought to make the bank, along with other organizations involved in international commerce, agents of 
its foreign policy. The involvement of business in the implementation of government policy is neither new nor 
unique to the United States. The current ban by the U.S. and the European Union on importing from, exporting to or 
exchanging currency with Myanmar is an example of this.  
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If the headquarters of the International Bank and Trust had been in the Cayman Islands, if a majority of the 
stockholders had been non-US based, or if the Beirut office had been structured as a joint venture with a Lebanese 
bank, the US would still have been able to leverage access to US markets as its bargaining position in negotiating for 
compliance, but it would have had a weaker legal basis for compelling the bank to execute the order. It would only 
be able to revoke a license for operating on US territory rather than to close the entire business and it would have 
had less authority to threaten executives with criminal action for noncompliance. 
 
In this case, the International Bank and Trust was compelled to act as a US corporation with overseas 
offices. Whether or not it would have complied with the executive order had it the ability to choose is not a 
consideration; the fact of it being headquartered in New York gave the US government a sufficient legal basis for 
controlling its actions.   
 
The Negotiation 
 
As the regional manager, Ted would have had the opportunity to set the stage for critical debate and open 
communication (Ayoko, 2006, p. 350). Rashid’s opening statement of non-compliance may have been an emotional 
reaction, an opening ploy for a negotiation, or evidence of a poor communication channel with his manager. It does, 
however, demonstrate that Ted’s authority over the situation has been compromised, as Rashid’s position indicates 
that he values his customers and employees more than whatever reward or deprivation Ted is capable of delivering 
(See: Bachrach & Baratz, 1963, p. 635). 
 
Depending on the strength of their relationship before the start of this crisis, both Rashid and Ted may be 
simultaneously experiencing feelings of trust and distrust for each other. (See: Lewicki, 1998, p. 448). While each 
may have understood the legitimacy of the other’s goals and interests, both weighed their positions and arrived at 
different assessments of the relevant priorities. Both may be experiencing uncertainty about their courses of action, 
limited by the options they see in front of them and forced to take action they understand to be leading to conflict. 
The scenario is well characterized by Simon’s (2006, p. 96) statement that “The toughest challenges in decision 
making may be those where the options are clear but present powerfully conflicted desires.” 
 
 The directive to identify and freeze the Iranian assets showed little sensitivity to the local situation. 
Rashid’s stated position, that he will not comply with the order, reflects his underlying interests – ensuring the safety 
of his staff, the “safe haven” reputation of his business, and the financial assets of some of his principal clients. Ted 
may be able to negotiate effectively with Rashid if he understands the distinction between Rashid’s stated position 
and the interests Rashid is seeking to appease (Bazerman, 2009, p. 153). 
 
Rashid, by announcing a contrarian position, has set a stage where non-rational escalation of the conflict is 
a very real possibility (Bazerman, 2009, p. 172, citing Staw). It is Ted’s turn to respond. He must do so in a way 
which creates a positive value for Rashid (Bazerman, 2009, p. 169) and enable him to offer each of his principal 
stakeholders some accommodation. 
 
GENERAL COMMENTS 
 
 Given the relatively short time frame in which the decision must be made, the case presents an opportunity 
for in-class discussion as an exercise in negotiation and trust-building and can be accomplished in a single session. 
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